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Using information from the personnel files of a South African clothing firm, I explore the in- and outflow of weekly-
paid workers. These employees form a separate labour market within the company. Data was available concerning 
both the productivity of current workers, and the characteristics of rejected applicants and fired workers. This makes it 
possible to identify the characteristics which are screened out at entry and the characteristics that influence 
productivity. This allows for an empirical analysis of discrimination at job-entry. 
Hiring decisions were found to be consistent with expected productivity. The observed screening out of African 
workers at job entry could be explained by statistical discrimination, i.e., the actual productivity of African workers in 
this firm was found to be significantly lower than the productivity of workers of other ethnic backgrounds. The effect 
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This paper examines the careers of 586 weekly-paid workers in a South African clothing firm.  
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The data set includes information on the personal characteristics and productivity of a subset 
of currently employed weekly-paid workers. What makes the data set unusual is that it also 
includes information on the personal characteristics of a group of job-applicants who were not 
hired and the personal characteristics of a group of former employees who were fired because 
their productivity was too low. This data allows us to separate the characteristics that 
influence the hiring decisions from the characteristics that influence productivity. The focus of 
the paper is on the hiring decisions of the firm: is the screening of individuals at entry based 
solely on the expected productivity of applicants, which would indicate statistical 
discrimination, or is it also based on non-productivity related characteristics, which would 
indicate real discrimination?  
Although this case-study is limited by the fact that a detailed analysis of the internal labour 
market could only be performed for a subset of workers in one firm, the analyses in this paper 
have some relevance for several lines of economic enquiry. Firstly, they bear direct relevance 
to the search and matching literature (for a review see e.g. Ridder and Van den Berg, 1997). 
Secondly, the analysis is concerned with the internal dynamics of one firm and thus has some 
relevance for the internal labour market literature (see e.g. Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom, 
1994). Lastly, the results indicate the relevance of statistical discrimination for actual firm 
policy. 
 
In the second section, the data set is described. 
In the third section, an empirical model of the careers of weekly-paid workers is developed 
and explained. In section four, the empirical results are presented. Section five concludes. 
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2.  Descriptive statistics 
 
The firm under investigation kept extensive records on all individuals who came into contact 
with it. We will only focus on the records that were kept of weekly-paid employees, who form 
about 80% of the current workforce. Firstly, the firm kept personnel records of all current and 
former weekly-paid employees, containing information on personal characteristics and on the 
careers within the firm (length of experience, wages). Secondly, the company kept separate 
records on the productivity of current weekly-paid employees over the last 18 months. Also, 
the company had records of individuals who had applied for jobs, but who were rejected. By 
combining all these records, a data set was constructed of 586 individuals. In Table 1, the 586 
individuals are divided into three groups, reflecting their past and current affiliation to this 
firm:  
Table 1  
Statistics of the internal labour market for weekly-paid jobs 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Weekly-paid    Failed applicants  Dismissed from 
current employees for weekly-paid jobs  weekly-paid 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
education in years   7.5    8.1  7.4 
  st. dev. of educ.    4.9    1.8  2.6 
 
Wage in 1993 in Rands  223    -  - 
  st. dev. of wage    0    -  - 
 
Productivity    92    -  - 
  st. dev.     11.5    -  - 
 
# Females    442    48  54 
# African    18    27  2 
# Indian      462    25  52 
# with productivity known  380    -  - 
 
N      480    52  54 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In general, the data mainly concerns Indian females with a large variation in educational  
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attainment. There were no whites at all at this wage level and only a few Africans. 
The first column in Table 1 shows the characteristics of the weekly-paid employees actually 
working in this firm. Information on the average productivity during the previous 18 months 
was available for 380 of these workers. A peculiarity of the group of weekly-paid workers is 
that they all received the same industry-negotiated wage and hence there was no wage 
variation: perhaps to avoid the resentment that many weekly-paid employees have against 
differential payment which creates differences in local status (see Frank, 1985). 
The second column of Table 1 describes the characteristics of a group of individuals who 
applied for weekly-paid jobs at the firm, but were rejected. We see that the group of rejected 
applicants contains relatively more Africans. The third column describes the characteristics of 
a number of weekly-paid workers who had worked for this firm in the past, but who were 
fired because their productivity was too low. 
Before going on to describe the internal labour market further in the next section, some 
comments on the way productivity of weekly-waged workers was measured in the firm are 
relevant here. Productivity was measured by averaging the efficiency ratings of a weekly-paid 
worker over the period October 1991 till April 1993. These efficiency ratings were based on 
an evaluation of the total amount of clothes that a worker handles and thus represent the 
amount of faultless clothes that a worker sewed, pressed or examined during this period, 
compared to the amount that the average worker was found to process in this company in such 
a time-span.  
An example from daily practice may make this clear. Consider the efficiency ratings of a 
machinist, who makes clothes on a sewing-machine. The number of clothes she manages to 
make are recorded every day. The clothes were checked for faults and if any faults were 
found, the clothes were returned to that worker and efficiency points for those clothes were 
withheld until they were faultless, thus maintaining a consistent quality. The number of 
faultless clothes made by a worker is then transformed into an efficiency-rating for the day. At  
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the end of a week, workers with high efficiency ratings are given small, and unfortunately 
unrecorded, monetary bonuses as an incentive. These bonuses make up about 5% to 10% of 
the weekly-paid wage bill of the firm.  
The estimate of productivity is thus an indicator of the physical quality-adjusted-output of 
individuals in weekly-paid jobs. 
  
  6 
 
3.   The empirical model 
 
The careers of weekly-paid workers have three stages: entry into the weekly-paid segment of 
the firm, production, and exit from the weekly-paid segment of the firm. Each stage is 
described. Then an empirical model is constructed with which to analyse the hiring and firing 
behaviour of the firm.
2 
In the first stage, applicants for weekly-paid jobs are screened at entry with the use of a 
nimbleness test. If applicants pass this test, it is stated firm policy to offer them a weekly-paid 
job at this firm. However, when information from the test results is collated with the ensuing 
hiring decisions, a different picture emerges. Consider the following probit equation which 
shows the dependence between the probability of being hired, the results of the test, and 
individual characteristics (education, age, ethnic classification): 
 
P[being hired] = Φ(-0.31 + 0.04*educ - 0.004*age + 1.15*test - 2.04*African) 





                     
2 Given that the empirical literature on the analysis of personnel files is very sparse (for a review see 
Prendergast, 1996), there are few empirical facts to guide the discussion here (cf. Baker et al., 1994). 
where the variable “test” denotes a dummy indicating whether the test was followed success-
fully or not, and where “African” is a dummy denoting whether the applicant was classified as 
an African or not. N contains the rejected applicants and a control group containing current 
workers who applied at the same time as the rejected job-applicants. The results are strikingly  
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at odds with stated firm policy: not only is passing the test important for the chances of being 
hired, at least as important is not being an African. The practice is that most Africans are 
screened out at entry. By modelling the hiring policy explicitly, we will ascertain whether the 
screening of Africans is due to real discrimination or statistical discrimination. 
In the second stage, the productivity stage, a weekly-paid worker is set to work and is given 
some time (about a year) to raise her average productivity above 80.
3 All workers whose 
productivity remains below 80, or whose productivity falls below 80 for a period, are fired. A 
worker whose productivity remains above 80 eventually retires, gets promoted, or leaves the 
firm for personal reasons (no detailed information is available on these non-productivity 
related exits).  
 
                     
3 The number 80 comes from two sources: firstly it is stated firm policy and secondly, there are no 
current workers with a productivity much below 80 (there are some current workers with productivity slightly 
below 80 though as it takes a sustained period of below 80 productivity to be fired). The stated policy is therefore 
assumed to be actual practice.  
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Constructing an explicit model of these careers, it is assumed that the firm’s actual policy is to 
take an estimate of the productivity of the applicant as a basis for the decision of whether to 
hire an applicant or not. This estimate of productivity is denoted by Zi. As all the weekly-paid 
workers in this category have the same wage, the optimal hiring criterion would be to hire 
everybody with an expected productivity above a fixed reservation productivity, Rh.
4 The 
same reasoning holds for the firing decision of the firm: as wages are not related to age or 
experience, it is optimal to fire anyone with a productivity lower than a firing reservation 
productivity Rf. If the hiring reservation productivity is very low, then the firm “tries out” 
many individuals, which can be optimal if the costs of hiring and firing are low. Similarly, a 
high hiring reservation productivity would indicate high costs of hiring and firing. The hiring 
reservation productivity thus gives us some indirect indication of the costs of hiring and firing. 
 
Productivity and the estimate a company makes of that productivity are thus defined: 
 
Prodi = α + βEduci + γ′Xi + εi      ε~N(0,σ
2) 
  (1) 
Zi - τi = α + βEduci + γ′Xi       τ~N(0,v
2)    (2) 
 
Prod equals productivity, Educ stands for the years of formal schooling. 
X is a vector of personal characteristics including age, years of experience, marital 




2 are assumed to be independent of observed 
                     
4 This will hold, assuming for simplicty approximately infinitely long working careers, as long as 
the expected productivity profile of an individual after entry depends only on expected productivity at 
entrance. If productivity changed strongly non-linearly over time (for instance through non-linear age 
profiles), this will not hold. Fortunately, there were no strong non-linearities found, which allows for the 
above simplification. 
5 If the employer can observe productivity related characteristics unavailable in the data set, one can 
expect εi and τi to be positively correlated. A test for correlation showed that the correlation coefficient between 
εi and τi was only 0.07 which was insignificant at the 90% confidence level. The assumption of independence is  




(Zi - τi) is the estimate that the company has of a worker's productivity at the moment that 
(s)he applies for a weekly-paid job, whereby τi reflects the demand variations at the time of 
assessment. If there are no demand variations, then the firm should always hire someone with 
a productivity-estimate greater than Rh, making v=0. Once a worker is hired, that worker will 
not be fired until her productivity falls below Rf for a period, where after she is fired.  
We now incorporate the possibility of job-discrimination by allowing the hiring reservation to 
differ for different ethnic and gender groups
7. We model the possibility of job-discrimination 
by specifying Rh =constant+θ0African+θ1Male 
If θ0 is bigger than zero, an African applicant would need to have a higher expected productiv-
ity than an Indian applicant and would hence face real discrimination. Similarly, if θ1 is 
greater than zero, males would need to have a higher expected productivity than females to be 
hired.  
A natural question to pose is whether the firing reservation productivity also differs for 
different workers? There are two reasons why the firing reservation productivity is taken to be 
constant. The first reason is a practical one: we would have to know the actual productivity of 
those fired to say with any certainty whether the firing reservation productivity differs 
according to the characteristics of workers. The personnel files of fired workers do not contain 
actual productivity data: the personnel files of those workers who were fired only contain 
information about complaints about the productivity of the individual and the official reasons 
given for dismissals. Hence the official reasons for dismissals are taken at face value and the 
productivity of those fired is taken to be below 80. 
                                                              
therefore maintained. 
6 Several versions of the model were tried which relaxed this assumption. No significant determinants of 
the variance of productivity and demand were found however. 
7 I thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.  
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The second reason why the firing reservation productivity is not endogenised is theoretical: if 
a firm wants to screen out individuals with certain characteristics, it is much cheaper to screen 
them out at entry: screening out unwanted characteristics at entry avoids hiring and firing 
costs. Hence, there is little reason to expect the firing reservation productivity to differ for 
different groups. Add to this the fact that the stated firing reservation productivity fits well 
with the observed distribution of productivity in the current group of workers, a constant firing 
reservation productivity of 80 is taken to be plausible. 
 
Summarising, the likelihood of the observations for this model can be formulated as
 
 
i∈H denotes a worker who was not hired 
i∈J denotes a worker who was hired and later fired 
i∈L denotes a worker who was hired and retained 
 
As f(.), the density function of the productivity distribution, and Z are assumed to be normally 
distributed, this likelihood reduces to: 
 
 
The first element of this likelihood (i∈H) denotes the likelihood of observing those individuals 
who were not hired, on the basis of their observed characteristics. This equals the likelihood 
that their expected productivity is below the hiring reservation productivity level. The second 
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part of the likelihood (i∈J) denotes the likelihood of observing the workers who were fired, 
which equals the likelihood that they had an actual productivity below the firing reservation 
productivity, conditional on the fact that their expected productivity was above the hiring 
reservation productivity. The third and last element of the likelihood function denotes the 
probability of observing the productivity of the active weekly-paid workers given that their 
hiring productivity is above the hiring reservation productivity. The estimates of the para-
meters of equation (3) are presented in the next section.  
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3.    Empirical estimates 
 
Table 2 shows the empirical results for equation (3) and compares them with a simple OLS on 
the productivity of current workers.  
      Table 2 
Hiring, firing and productivity in a South African clothing company in 1993* 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Method:   ML    OLS   
Productivity(1)  Productivity (2) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Determinants of Productivity 
 
Constant   72.17  (22.5)  74.62  (11.5)   
Years Of Experience   1.87   (5.2)   2.27   (3.6)     
YOE
2     -0.06   (2.6)  -0.08  (2.4)     
Education in years   0.53   (2.7)   0.46  (1.3)   
Age    -0.07  (1.2)  -0.002  (0.02 
σ     10.82  (33.4) 
v      4.55   (59.2) 
 
Dummies: 
Test     3.58   (7.9)   4.31  (0.9) 
Gender     4.25  (1.0)   3.00    (1.0) 
Married    -0.15   (0.2)   0.08    (0.06) 
African    -16.64  (3.9)  -13.15  (3.4) 
No-test-score   5.26   (4.0)  -1.12  (0.6) 
 
Determinants of the 
hiring reservation productivity: 
 
Intercept   70.42   (21.5) 
Male     7.73  (1.7) 
African    -11.66  (2.5) 
 
N     486    380   
R
2          0.151   
-2log(L)   3120         
 ______________________________________________________________________________________ 
* Absolute t-values in parenthesis. Experience includes tenure and previous experience. 
 
Looking at the ML-results first, we can see that the standard deviation of the hiring-residual is 
a lot smaller than the standard deviation of productivity as reported in Table 1, and is 
considerably smaller than the unexplained residual from the productivity model. This suggests 
that although the expected productivity of an applicant is not enough to explain hiring 
decisions (as v would be 0 in that case), hiring decisions are better explained by observable  
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characteristics than actual productivity. This good fit indirectly validates the assumption that 
the firm uses expected productivity as the criterion for hiring an applicant. 
The main implication of the results on the determinants of the hiring reservation productivity is 
the fact that the discrimination of Africans at job entry can be attributed to statistical 
discrimination: the hiring reservation productivity is lower for Africans than for Indians, 
implying a bias in favour of Africans. Hence, the screening out of Africans at entry can be 
attributed to their lower expected productivity in this firm. This expectation rests however 
entirely on the fact that the few Africans working in this company have a low average 
productivity. If African workers find it more difficult to operate in this firm (for instance 
because of difficulties of communicating with co-workers across cultural barriers), then the 
low productivity of Africans is the effect of the fact that they form a small minority in this 
firm. Given the fact that they are the minority in this firm and that their average productivity is 
significantly lower, it would seem optimal to screen out Africans at entry. 
Another interesting aspect about the hiring reservation productivity is that it is lower for all 
applicants than the firing reservation productivity. This means that the firm knowingly hires 
many applicants whom it expects to have to fire after a while in the hope that the productivity 
of these applicants is unexpectedly high: as σ is almost 11, only about 1 in 4 applicants with an 
expected productivity of 70 will eventually be retained by the firm. This means that the 
transaction costs of hiring and firing are low enough to make it optimal for the firm to “try out” 
many different employees. Given the absence of labour laws preventing dismissals in South 
Africa in 1993, this would seem plausible. Hiring costs were indeed low, as workers could start 
almost immediately and required little administrating. Firing costs included some severance 
pay (1 to 3 months pay), but required no long procedures. Trying out many employees was also 
possible in 1993 as the unemployment in the clothing industry provided a large pool of 
potential workers. Obviously, if firing and hiring transaction costs were to be increased, for 
instance through central legislation, the reservation hiring productivity would increase. The  
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firm would then try out less workers, leading eventually to a lower average productivity. 
The results on the hiring reservation productivity also show that males have to obtain a higher 
productivity to be hired for weekly-paid positions than females. There is some qualitative 
evidence to support this: when prospective workers apply for positions in the firm, mostly 
females are considered for the weekly-paid positions. Men do apply for such positions but are 
hardly ever considered for them. Thus gender discrimination applies at job entry, only this time 
in reverse of the normal pattern in South Africa (see e.g. Kraak, 1991; Innes et al., 1993; Bird, 
1992, who argue that in South Africa, the jobs that women do are usually low-paid and low-
status because they are done by women). 
 As to the characteristics influencing productivity, we see that the ML model, which allows for 
selectivity effects, has increased the OLS-estimate of the relationship between education and 
productivity only very slightly and the coefficients remain very small: 10 years of education 
adds about 6% to a weekly-waged worker's productivity, which would lead to a very low social 
rate of returns for weekly-paid workers. Thus productivity and education are only weakly 
related for the weekly-paid employees.                                    
Secondly, the profile of productivity according to experience suggests that productivity 
increases until 15 years of experience has been achieved and thereafter it decreases, probably 
reflecting the difficulty that older employees have in adapting to new equipment, new clothing 
patterns and new methods. 
Comparing the simple OLS-regression on current workers with the ML-model, we see that the 
experience profile is less pronounced and the education profile is more pronounced in the ML-
model. The difference in the effect of observable characteristics on productivity is insignificant 
however. The main advantage of the ML-model is thus the opportunity it offers to investigate 
hiring and firing policies. 
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5.  Conclusions and discussion 
 
In this paper a small model was constructed with which the careers of weekly-paid workers in a 
South African clothing firm were analysed. The analysis concentrated on the hiring policies of 
the firm. Because all weekly-paid workers earned the same industry negotiated wage, it was 
predicted that all job-applicants with an expected productivity greater than a hiring reservation 
productivity would be hired and that all those who did not achieve a firing reservation 
productivity would be fired. It indeed turned out that the expected productivity of an applicant 
was a good predictor for the decision to hire an applicant or not. 
From an analysis of the determinants of the hiring reservation productivity, it was found that 
there was no real discrimination against African workers: the reservation hiring productivity of 
African workers was even lower than that of Indian workers. The observed screening out of 
Africans at entry is hence explained by statistical discrimination, i.e., by the fact that the 
average productivity of Africans in this firm was lower than the productivity of Indians. It must 
be noted though that this result rests on the low average productivity of the few African 
workers in the firm. If they face high transaction costs with the Indian majority in this firm due 
to cultural differences, the results might not have been the same if the majority of weekly-paid 
workers in this firm had been African. 
Considering the characteristics that influence expected productivity, a weak but significantly 
positive relationship between education and productivity was found. The reason for the weak 
relationship might be that few of the skills acquired in education are used for weekly-paid jobs 
for which productivity data is available.  
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